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Invoking a long-held but no longer correct assumption, a recent book describes 
Turkey as "the only Muslim secular-democratic state" in the world.2 Much earlier, 
Bernard Lewis had ventured to answer the question of why Turkey was the only 
existing democratic Muslim-majority country by pointing out that it has had "the 
longest and closest contact" with Western civilization.3 However, without such a 
history or similar geographical proximity to the West, Indonesia has emerged since the 
fall of the dictator Soeharto in 1998 as another strong exemplar of an overwhelmingly 
Muslim-majority country where secular democratic politics are prevalent, no matter 
how faulty and predatory in nature.4
As in Turkey, Islamic forces in Indonesia continue to be active within secular 
democratic politics, pursuing parliamentary as well as extra-parliamentary strategies. 
In both cases as well, shadowy organizations have employed violent methods in their 
efforts to establish an Islamic state. But it is particularly in the arena of parliamentary
11 thank Andi Rachman, Harun Ercan, Benny Setiawan, and Khelmy Kalam Pribadi for the assistance they 
provided during fieldwork that contributed material for this article, and also Nicole Andres at Murdoch 
University.
2 Banu Eligur, The Mobilization o f Political Islam in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
p .l.
3 Bernard Lewis, "Why Turkey Is the Only Muslim Democracy," Middle East Quarterly 1,1 (1994): 41-49.
4 It is generally accepted that Muslims make up about 98 percent of the Turkish population of 73 million, 
and about 88 percent of the Indonesian population of close to 240 million people. The case for including 
the likes of Bangladesh and Pakistan on this exclusive, two-nation list of democratic, Muslim-majority 
countries remains rather weak given that electoral politics there have less convincingly supplanted 
authoritarian practices.
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democracy that a great contrast between Turkey and Indonesia has emerged: political 
parties that originated from Islamic-oriented social and political networks have been 
distinctly unsuccessful in post-authoritarian Indonesia when compared to their 
counterparts in Turkey. Nothing illustrates this distinction better than the fact that the 
Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) has ruled 
Turkey since 2002, while the most prominent of Indonesia's Islamic political parties, 
Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), has so far managed to 
garner less than 8 percent of the vote in its best national electoral performance. PKS is 
highly unlikely to take over the reins of the Indonesian government any time soon, 
although its inroads in provincial and regional-level elections have offered some 
compensation.
Why have Indonesia's Islamic parties only found limited success in the arena of 
electoral politics? Of course, this is a question that continues to vex the Islamic parties 
concerned and one that can be answered with the obvious rejoinder that there are large 
numbers of merely "statistical" Muslims in Indonesia, and therefore individuals who 
don't necessarily vote for Islamic parties. However, the situation is not so dissimilar in 
Turkey. Secularism has run deep in Turkish society since the Kemalist revolution that 
was spurred by the Ottoman defeat in the First World War and thus such issues as 
lifting the ban on female students wearing headscarves in universities continue to have 
a deeply polarizing effect.5 Yet Islamic party politics has been resoundingly successful 
there for almost a decade. It is therefore suggested here that culture-based 
explanations—even those based on deep knowledge of local values and ideas 
emerging from different interpretations of religious doctrine—are unlikely to account 
sufficiently for how Islamic political parties might fare under democratic frameworks, 
or to address larger questions about the reasons for the presence or absence of 
democracy in Muslim countries.
The intention of this article, nevertheless, is to address the more restricted matter of 
the inability of Indonesia's Islamic parties to launch a serious challenge to state power 
through insights that may be obtained via a close comparison with the Turkish case. By 
juxtaposing the PKS and AKP, in particular, this article offers a political economy- 
oriented understanding of the hitherto relatively limited achievements of Islamic party 
politics in Indonesia. The understanding is achieved not so much through a dissection 
of the parties in question as by a broad-based analysis of Islamic party politics in 
Indonesia in the context of social-structural changes since the advent of the New Order 
in the 1960s and the development of Indonesian capitalism. In the course of the 
analysis, Islamic party politics in Turkey is necessarily examined, too, in relation to 
capitalist development in that country. It is argued here that, unlike the AKP, the PKS 
has not been able to promote itself as an effective vehicle that will uphold the diverse 
social interests that have emerged out of Indonesia's modernization processes. In 
contrast to Turkey's AKP, the PKS has been unable to establish a coalition with 
populist credibility while simultaneously appealing to "rational" and "modern" 
policies and methods of governance. As a consequence, the PKS remains 
predominantly identified with an educated, urban, middle-class constituency, rather
5 The Kemalist Revolution abolished the previously existing sultanate and caliphate and ushered in a 
modern Turkish Republic that was nationalist and radically secular in ideology.
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than with an alliance of a cross-section of society waging their struggles under the 
banner of Islamic values or ideals.
There are ample grounds for a comparison with the Turkish case. The most 
obvious is that Turkey so far presents the most successful example of Islamic political 
forces being able to overcome secular rivals entrenched in the institutions of state 
power—outside of Iran, where the feat was, of course, achieved in 1979 through non- 
electoral means. Furthermore, although the Turkish experience lacks anything similar 
to the anti-communist bloodbath of the 1960s in Indonesia, Islamic forces in Turkey 
had likewise played a part in the suppression of Leftist political forces in the context of 
the Cold War, thereby greatly affecting the present social configuration of power and 
also greatly influencing the terrain on which Islamic politics operate. This inclination 
was seen most recently in the years following the military coup of 1980, when the 
Turkish military forged a temporary alliance with representatives of the Islamist 
stream of politics against a then-vibrant, if internally chaotic, Left.6 The Motherland 
Party-led government, which ruled for some time after the military returned power to 
civilian politicians in 1983, involved leaders of a distinctly Islamist hue, including 
members of tarekat, or religious orders, thereby providing an indication that the 
ascendancy of the AKP was not the result of some sudden development, but that 
underlying processes had been at work since decades earlier.
Comparisons with the Turkish case are also relevant because the PKS, so far the 
most successful of Islamic-oriented political parties in the post-Soeharto era, has quite 
consciously emulated the AKP in many respects since the Indonesian general election 
of 2004.7 In this connection, it is important that the AKP effectively represents a 
successful attempt to address the grievances of the swelling ranks of the urban poor 
and the ambitions of sometimes-frustrated young, upwardly mobile members of the 
educated middle class, as well as newly influential sections of the bourgeoisie against 
secular bureaucratic-military-business elites who have largely dominated the state 
since the inception of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923. By contrast, the ethnic 
composition of the Indonesian bourgeoisie presents the PKS with an almost intractable 
problem in bringing together powerful sections of big business, which is still 
dominated by Chinese-Indonesians as a legacy of the colonial division of labor, and 
elements of middle- and lower-class society. Another problem is that the populist 
arena in Indonesian politics has been long inhabited by established secular vehicles, as 
seen in the dominance of the state party, Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups), 
and its array of affiliates over a large part of organizational life during the New Order. 
This was seen as well in the late challenge posed by a resurgent, though rather muted, 
version of Soekarnoism onto which oppositional politics was focused—through the 
PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle)—for much of the final decade of 
Soeharto's rule. In other words, both government and opposition forces in the late
6 Interview with Faik Bulit, Leftist public intellectual, Istanbul, October 13, 2010. Also see Eligur, The 
Mobilization o f Political Mam in Turkey, pp. 88-93.
7 Anthony Bubalo, Greg Fealy, and Whit Mason, "Zealous Democrats: Islamism and Democracy in Egypt, 
Indonesia, and Turkey," The Lowy Institute for International Policy Working Paper no. 25 (2008), pp. 71- 
72, available at www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=909 (accessed October 10, 2010). In this report, 
influential PKS secretary general Anis Matta is described specifically as expressing great interest in 
studying the success of the AKP, which he attributes to adeptness in combining Islam with political and 
economic competence or credibility.
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Soeharto years were not based on Islamic networks, in spite of the co-optation of 
Muslim middle-class intellectuals into the regime through ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan 
Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals), a once ambitious 
organization that has now virtually dissipated. In fact, it was quite evident that the 
leaders of Islamic organizations considered to be "hardline" or "radical" were nowhere 
to be seen during the anti-Soeharto uprisings in 1998 that followed the Asian Economic 
Crisis. In spite of the key part played by KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim 
Indonesia, National Front of Indonesian Muslim Students) in student demonstrations, 
and the galvanizing role played by Muhammadiyah leader Amien Rais, the street 
protests of 1998 that helped to bring Soeharto down had very little to do overtly with 
the aspirations of Islamic politics.8
It is significant that the major vehicle of secular politics in Turkey, the CHP 
(Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People's Party) had already lost its 
monopoly over state power and societal organization as early as 1950, when it was 
defeated in a general election.9 Although the AKP must continually confront the 
secular, nationalist Kemalist bulwark (especially in the judiciary and military), Islamic 
forces have had room to maneuver and develop since the 1950s in a way that was not 
possible for their Indonesian counterparts. By contrast, Golkar never allowed itself to 
perform poorly in elections, even if it meant continually resorting to manipulation. 
Moreover, due to past stringent Kemalist policies that restricted organized religious 
activity, the AKP faces no entrenched mass organization that can make demands on 
the allegiance of large sections of the ummah (Muslim community) on the basis of habit, 
tradition, or family background. The PKS, on the other hand, confronts the still 
formidable and vast, but typically quietist, networks of the Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, the country's largest Islamic organization). Those groups may 
have formed to protect the interests of urban traders and rural elites in the late colonial 
social order, but since then they have acquired a broad base of support and, more 
importantly, continue to enjoy legitimacy at the grassroots level in the present 
democracy. In other words, the PKS confronts rivals within and outside of Islamic 
politics, and those located within and outside of the state, in ways that the AKP does 
not. This is in spite of constitutional restrictions imposed on Islamic-oriented politics in 
Turkey and the threat of Kemalist reaction that might have been expected to severely 
constrain Islamist political parties.
Electoral Democracy and Islam
Comparing the experiences of the PKS and the AKP is a particularly instructive 
exercise, because the majority of analyses of Indonesian Islamic politics have lacked a 
comparative dimension and, therefore, missed some of the insights that may be 
obtained from looking beyond the limits of the Indonesian case, in spite of notable 
exceptions.10 It is true that the development of both parties could be easily taken to
8 For a contrary assessment of the events of 1998 and the role of Islamic social forces, see John Sidel, Riots, 
Pogroms, and Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
9 The Republican People's Party was defeated by the Democratic Party, which was overthrown in 1960 by 
a military coup. The Democratic Party leader and prime minister, Adnan Menderes, who had been 
accommodating toward Islamic groups, was hanged by the military.
10 See, for example, Robert Hefner, ed., Remaking Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
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substantiate the idea, cherished by those looking through rosy liberal lenses, that 
participation in electoral politics inherently exerts ideologically moderating influences 
on Islamic political parties. However, the two parties' combined experiences suggest a 
process more complex than one of attitudinal changes favoring democracy that result 
from rising general economic prosperity or growing affluence in certain sections of 
society.11 One should not overlook the fact that transformations within the PKS and the 
AKP—two major parties in the world of Islamic politics that have abandoned overt 
struggles to form an Islamic state in favor of a broad, good-governance-oriented 
agenda—have been dictated by the practical exigencies of navigating through 
particular constellations of power and interest. We are thus forced to look beyond 
simple issues of Islamic versus secular values to understand their trajectories.
It is well known that the PKS and the AKP have roots in social groups and 
networks that advocated for some sort of transformation towards an Islamic state, and 
that neither party overtly places that aim at the forefront of their agendas today. Unlike 
its immediate precursor, the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK), the PKS has opted to 
subordinate the struggle to establish a state based on sharia to enshrining good 
governance and political integrity, with the goal being to expand its base of support.12 
More recently, PKS has controversially declared itself to be an "open party"—that is, 
one that welcomes non-Muslims to the fold, though in practice one would be certainly 
hard-pressed to find non-Muslims holding important positions within the party.13 
Similarly, some AKP activists prefer to refer to themselves as "conservative 
democrats," rather than Islamists.14 15On the other hand, members of the party have been 
cited describing it as an organization made up of "Muslim democrats."13 Of course, 
AKP members are cognizant of the dangers of being tagged with the "Islamic party" 
label. Since opting to run in 2002 on a platform that relegated issues of the Islamic state 
to the background, the AKP has been fostering an image as a modern, forward-looking 
party, adeptly combining moral values, populist social policy, and economic 
neoliberalism. In doing so, it took full advantage of the general sentiment that 
mismanagement on the part of a decrepit previous government had been responsible 
for the economic crisis of 2001.
In a nutshell, the AKP offers a marriage between morality and the market. The 
regular use of the term "conservative" by the AKP to describe itself is significant; it is 
meant to signal adherence to governance based on morality—which in the Turkish 
context logically flows from Islam—as opposed to an overt commitment to Islamic law.
2005); and Robert Hefner, ed., Making Modern Muslims: The Politics o f Islamic Education in Southeast Asia 
(Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2009), among a relatively small number of works.
11 Vali Nasr, The Forces o f Fortune: The Rise o f the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our 
World (New York, NY: Free Press, 2009).
12 Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), p. 234.
13 There was already a precedent for non-Muslims' participation. See Bubalo et al.. Zealous Democrats, p. 66: 
" ... in areas with large non-Muslim populations, the PKS has nominated Christian candidates for 
legislative positions. In eastern Indonesia, for example, nine of the party's candidates at the 2004 elections 
were non-Muslim, one of whom was elected."
14 Interview with members of the youth wing of the Istanbul branch of the AKP, October 13, 2010, in 
Istanbul.
15 Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee, The Rise o f Political Islam in Turkey (Santa Monica, CA: Rand,
2008), p. 54.
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In a way that is not too dissimilar, PKS activists today suggest that the party still aims 
to ensure the running of the state according to ways that accord to the spirit of Islamic 
precepts without necessarily forcing sharia on the electorate.16 Although the PKS's 
apparent retreat on the issue has attracted the most attention, in fact the position of 
other Islamic parties is not so different.1
Several theses and books have already been written, including by Indonesian 
authors, about the role of Muslim campus groups in the initial history of what became 
the PKS.18 In fact, the PKS has certainly benefited from the narrative that it was 
established by idealistic yet learned young people, not out of place in modern 
institutions such as the university. It is well known that members of the so-called 
tarbiyah (education) movement, largely based on campus, were instrumental in the 
formation of what later evolved into the PK and then the PKS. It was no coincidence 
that the movement, organized into small cells in which "seniors" acted to discipline 
"juniors" through the inculcation of Islamic precepts,19 grew, almost in clandestine 
fashion, even while the New Order was repressing open student organizational life 
from the late 1970s. Moreover, the PKS has tried to establish a related image as a 
"clean" party, dissimilar fundamentally to others that are at home with Indonesia's 
infamously rampant corruption.
PKS was aided by the fact that many of its leaders emerged from a new generation 
of Islamic activists, hailing from the new urban middle class and in possession of high 
educational qualifications. Ostensibly, few have strong direct links with long- 
established Islamic organization vehicles, and, indeed, upon close examination, the 
political genealogies of the individuals who lead the PKS are actually quite varied. 
These range from links to the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah, to KISDI (Komite Indonesia 
untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic 
World), and even the Masyumi, which was banned by Soekarno in I960.20 Many of 
these leaders had earlier embarked on careers as teachers, or young professionals and 
technocrats, and it is logical that some of these would have flirted with ICMI—the 
organization established in 1990 to smooth relations between Soeharto and the Islamic 
community.21 It is notable that ICMI was set up to help co-opt young members of the 
new Islamic urban middle class—a cohort that had been produced by sustained 
economic growth, and whose members' social ambitions were then already rising—by 
providing a conduit into the bureaucracy and to state power more generally. For
16 Interview with Rama Pratama, former student activist and current central leadership member of the 
PKS, July 14, 2010, in Jakarta.
17 See Bernhard Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy (Singapore: ISEAS, 
2009), chapter 4. Also, my interview with Lukman Hakim Syaifuddin, member of parliament for PPP 
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party), Jakarta, July 12, 2010. He stated that the PPP 
would only implement sharia if it is what the public wants.
18 Apart from Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy: Piety and Pragmatism (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), see Imdadun Rahmat, Ideologi Politik PKS: Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung 
Parlemen (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2008); Ahmad Norma Permata, "Islamist Party and Democratic Participation: 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia, 1998-2006" (PhD dissertation, University of Munster, 2008); 
and Yon Machmudi, "Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of the Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice 
Party (PKS)" (PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 2006).
19 Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy: Piety and Pragmatism, p. 208.
20 Ibid., p. 126.
21 Interview with Imdadun Rahmat, deputy general secretary of the Nahdlatul Ulama, Jakarta, July 5, 2010.
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example, Nur Mahmudi Ismail, a former president of the PKS, had been an employee 
of BPPT (Badan Penerapan dan Pengkajian Teknologi, Agency for the Assessment and 
Application of Technology)—an institution then under the auspices of B. J. Habibie— 
and charged by Soeharto with leading ICMI from its inception. On the other hand, a 
guiding figure within the PK/PKS since its birth is Hilmy Aminuddin, who is credited 
with having been especially instrumental in disseminating the ideas of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood in Indonesia, including those on organizational methods. He did 
so upon returning from studies in the Middle East and after a period in the 1980s 
during which he was detained by the military for his political activism. Interestingly, 
Hilmy Aminuddin is the son of Danu Muhammad Hasan, a noted Darul Islam leader, 
who was often accused of having been an operative of the infamous early New Order 
Machiavellian figure, General Ali Moertopo.22
Similar to the PKS, the AKP likes to present itself as the party of choice for the 
educated youth, although it also rightly takes pride in its popularity with the most 
downtrodden in society, especially the urban poor.23 In the case of the AKP, its 
embrace of democracy and market capitalism, and abandonment of the language of 
Islamic politics, has generated considerable support from Western governments, in 
spite of the Islamist background of many of its leaders, including current Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul. Such a background 
might have been expected to generate the opposite response, given the mood that 
characterizes a world deeply affected by the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks on the 
United States. It may be considered an irony, too, that the AKP has been spearheading 
Turkey's charge into the European Union, although its efforts have fallen short of 
acquiring EU membership. Notwithstanding these matters, the internal composition of 
the AKP is fairly complex, accommodating pious as well as more pragmatic 
tendencies, and characterized by loyalties that may shift depending on the issues at 
hand.24
It is notable that the success of the AKP has encouraged the celebration of what is 
referred to as the 'Turkish model" of Islamic accommodation with democracy.25 But 
the way in which the lingering threat of authoritarian reaction from within the still- 
formidable institutions of the Kemalist social order—not least the military and 
judiciary—has affected the development of this "model" should not be 
underestimated. It could be reasonably suggested that it is this ever-present threat of 
authoritarian reaction, from what is referred to as a highly secretive "deep state," 
which has been the most crucial factor in the AKP's embrace of democracy and the free 
market, rather than an injection of particular kinds of values typically associated with 
market-oriented, liberal democracies. Quite plainly, the AKP leaders have found that 
Islamist pronouncements in the Turkish context inevitably invite repression by the
22 A1 Chaidar, "Perpecahan dan Integrasi: Perkembangan Darul Islam di Indonesia dan Jaringartnya di 
Asia Tenggara, 1962-2006" (unpublished paper, 2006), pp. 8, 29. Also see Machmudi, "Islamising 
Indonesia," pp. 93-94.
23 See Jenny B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle, WA: University 
of Washington Press, 2002).
24 "No Splits in Turkey's Governing AKP Parliamentary Party," 05ANKARA7215, US Embassy, Ankara, 12 
August 2005, available at http: / / wikileaks.derinden.net/belge/05ANKARA7215 (accessed December 12, 
2010).
25 Nasr, The Forces o f Fortune, chapter 9.
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military—the ultimate institutional guardians of the Kemalist social order. As AKP 
sympathizers note, its leaders learned the hard way from the experience of the Islamic- 
oriented Welfare Party, which briefly held government power in the mid-1990s before 
the so-called "post-modern" military coup of 1997.26 Moreover, the AKP's enthusiasm 
for global free markets provides it with an instrument to cultivate the support of the 
Anatolian bourgeoisie, most of whom self-identify as Islamic and many of whom had 
been shunned by Kemalists in favor of the so-called "Istanbul bourgeoisie"—big 
business groups that had been cultivated under protectionist and largely ISI-oriented 
(import substitution industries) policies.27 For this Anatolian bourgeoisie, primarily 
based in export-oriented activities, free-market policies already provide a lucrative 
gateway into European and other markets. Importantly, for the AKP itself, the embrace 
of the market, notably through pro-European Union (EU) policies, also invites a level 
of international protection from its Kemalist foes. In sum, the AKP has moved away 
from the traditional mold of an Islamist party struggling to establish a state based on 
Islamic law not simply because of the internalization of democratic values related to 
the growing affluence of the Turkish middle class (as suggested by Nasr), but also 
because it is an effective response to the still considerable influence of its foes within 
the institutions of the state.
It should be recalled in this connection that the coup of 1997 was ostensibly 
launched because the Welfare Party government under the late then-Prime Minister 
Necmettin Erbakan, that most venerable icon of Turkish Islamist politics, was alleged 
to have contravened secular tenets of the Turkish Constitution. As prime minister, 
Erbakan rather recklessly invited danger by taking up Islamic themes and even 
promising to roll back the Kemalist revolution.28 The stance taken by the AKP since its 
inception, therefore, has been about identifying an effective strategy of political 
survival and advancement, especially against the ever-present threat of political 
demise due to military repression. It should be noted additionally that the charismatic 
AKP leader Erdogan had built his early career as a protege of Erbakan. In fact, he was a 
leading Welfare Party figure and mayor of Istanbul until the military coup. In its 
aftermath, he served time in prison and was temporarily banished from politics. Again, 
there is therefore no doubt that the AKP leadership knows all too well about the 
dangers of providing the military any reason to move against it. Indeed, Kemalist 
forces had attempted to ban the AKP as recently as 2008, on the pretext that it was 
undermining Turkish secularism and plotting change toward an Islamist system. This 
move was ostensibly triggered by the AKP's support for lifting the ban on headscarves 
in universities.29
26 Interview with Ihsan Dagi, Middle East Technical Institute, Ankara, October 22, 2010. The widely used 
term "post-modern" coup is apparently a reference to the fact that the military ousted a government 
without dissolving parliament or suspending the constitution.
27 Ayse Bugra, "Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business 
Associations," International Journal o f Middle East Studies 30,4 (1998): 521-39.
28 Nasr, The Forces o f Fortune, p. 240.
29 "Turkish Court Considers AKP Ban," Islam Online, March 31, 2008, www.islamonline.net/servlet/ 
Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1203758585387&pagename=Zone-English-News/NWELayout (accessed July 5, 
2010). In October 2010, senior military figures refused to attend a ceremony at which the headscarf- 
wearing wife of President Abdullah Gul was present.
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The prominent role of the military in the political history of Indonesia and Turkey 
is thus another commonality shared by the two countries. As Mohammad Ayoob 
points out in a discussion of military politics in Indonesia and Turkey, the Indonesian 
armed forces have been likewise a ferocious guardian of state secularism, a function 
that has led to an often adversarial relationship with Islamic political forces.30 For 
example, Islamist social and political networks famously suffered the brunt of military 
repression in Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s, largely because their presence went 
against the logic of "floating mass" politics pursued by the New Order.31 Indeed, the 
military's move against its erstwhile allies against communism had a strong basis. 
Following the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), only Islam had 
real grassroots support outside of the state, and, therefore, the gradual development by 
the New Order of a social and political system characterized by the demobilization of 
social forces in the name of economic development was bound to rile activists by 
disproportionately affecting Islamic groups. Thus the turn against Islam resulted in 
clashes between state forces and a mysterious group called Komando Jihad, as well as 
the well-publicized massacres of members of Islamic oppositional groupings in 
Telangsari, Lampung, and in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta. These and other cases were 
followed by the persecution and imprisonment of Islamic leaders, usually with 
genealogical links to either the Darul Islam or the Masyumi. In the sphere of formal 
politics, the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, the Unity Development Party), then 
the "official" vehicle of Islam, was forced by new legislation to proclaim allegiance in 
the mid-1980s to the amorphous secular state ideology of Pancasila, thereby robbing it 
of an important tool to distinguish itself from other New Order-era electoral vehicles.
Nevertheless, there is no meaningful threat of a military clampdown on the PKS 
within Indonesia's democracy. While PKS's abandonment of overt support for an 
Islamic state—much derided as betrayal by those groups considered in the "hardline" 
camp32—was related to efforts to broaden its potential voter base, the party does not 
face the possibility of being coercively eliminated from the political stage. It can, and 
has, simply made reference to both Islam and Pancasila in the party constitution, 
thereby suggesting some happy internal accommodation between Islam and the 
secular state. So, relative to the AKP, does the PKS represent a more clear-cut case of 
the inherently moderating effects of democracy on Islamist political agendas? Can we 
say that the PKS has been more successful than other Islamic-oriented parties in 
Indonesia because it has internalized values associated with the workings of liberal 
democracies? While it would be tempting to reply to these questions in the affirmative, 
other factors have been at work that account for the way the PKS steers its way 
through Indonesia's post-Soeharto democracy—factors that should not be 
underestimated.
First of all, the PKS operates within a system of power where a particularly 
predatory form of democratic politics entails ad-hoc alliances with an assortment of 
interests at the national and local levels. These alliances are typically characterized by
30 Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces o f  Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World (Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007), p. 107.
31 "Floating mass" refers to the New Order policy of making sure that societal groups in Indonesia were 
politically demobilized through strict government control of a range of grassroots organizations.
32 Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, chairman of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Yogyakarta, July 21, 2010.
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murky elite-level wheeling and dealing, and cemented by the deployment of money 
politics. Such alliances are always quite fluid because they are rarely about common 
policy agendas or ideological compatibility. Instead, they are about the establishment 
of coalitions of power embroiled in competition for control of public institutions and 
resources for the purpose of private capital accumulation.33 It is partly for this reason 
that political Islam splintered quickly into different political parties after 1998, each of 
which has become the basis for attempts to build new patronage networks that 
compete for the spoils of state power. In spite of PKS's self-portrayal as being above 
and beyond such a rapacious system, the party seems to have been increasingly sucked 
into its defining logic. It is no wonder, therefore, that some associated with PKS have 
been tainted by the brush of corruption, thus undermining the claim that the party 
represents morality and integrity. Secondly, the PKS has been startlingly active in 
supporting the move to name Soeharto a "national hero,"34 which has inevitably 
invited accusations that the Cendana family was campaigning and paying for the 
bestowment of such an accolade as part of an attempt at political rehabilitation. All of 
the above suggests that the ideological "softening" of the PKS has been due as much to 
the demands of operating in a corrupt system rife with money politics, for instance, by 
taking part in predatory alliances, as it has been the result of liberalizing values within 
the party.
None of the foregoing analysis contradicts the idea that Islamic political parties can 
thrive in democracies and that participation in electoral competition may force such 
parties to develop more socially inclusive positions.35 What it does suggest is that the 
thesis directly linking market-led political democratization to Islamic moderation is too 
simple; the thesis is also clearly inadequate to explain the trajectories of the PKS in 
Indonesia and the AKP in Turkey.
Further comparison shows that the two parties have not been equally successful in 
their respective political arenas. While the PKS has clearly done better than other 
Indonesian Islamic-oriented parties, it has never been poised to take over government. 
At the national level, at best it has developed sufficient significance to participate in the 
coalition that sustains the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). 
Furthermore, there are signs that the PKS will find it hard to progress much beyond 
what it has already achieved in electoral competition. As the PK, it won just 1.7 percent 
of the vote in the 1999 general elections and just seven of the 462 seats in the national 
parliament. In 2004, great strides were made when the party obtained 7.4 percent of the 
vote and, therefore, won significant representation in parliament, taking 45 seats out of 
a total of 550.36In spite of that success and heightened expectations, the PKS only
33 Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics o f Oligarchy in an Age of 
Markets (London: Routledge, 2004); and Vedi R. Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A 
Southeast Asia Perspective (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).
34 Caroline Damanik, "Nanti, PKS UsulkanLagi," kompas.com, November 12, 2010, http:/ /nasional. 
kompas.com/ read/2010/11 /12/ 1529009/Nanti..PKS.Usulkan.Soeharto.Lagi (accessed November 20, 
2010) .
35 This is the case even if it remains uncertain whether, and to what degree, FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) in 
Algeria would have been transformed if its electoral win had not been subverted by the military in the 
1990s; or whether the broader context of the highly charged Palestinian-Israeli conflict hinders internal 
change within Hamas toward a meaningful accommodation with democratic practices.
36 See Jusuf Wanandi, "The Indonesian General Elections 2004," Asia-Pacific Review, 11,2 (2004): 118.
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managed 7.9 percent of the vote (and 57 out of 560 available seats) in 2009," after 
having confidently projected that it would win as much as 20 percent of the votes.18 In 
fact, the three biggest parties in Indonesia today are secular in outlook: the Democratic 
Party of incumbent President SBY; Golkar, the former state vehicle of the New Order; 
and the PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, the Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle) of Megawati Soekarnoputri. It is arguable that the PKS decision to 
accept non-Muslim members, thereby further distancing itself from its Islamic roots, 
was due to its poor showings in recent elections, a strategy taken despite the inevitable 
controversy it would cause among the party rank-and-file.37 89
By comparison, the electoral track record of the AKP has been nothing short of 
astonishing. In the 2002 elections, the AKP won 34.3 percent of the votes and 363 out of 
550 national parliamentary seats.40 In the 2007 general election, the AKP won 46.6 
percent of the votes and 341 of 550 parliamentary seats. It handily crushed its main 
competitors, the CHP (90 seats) and the ultra-nationalist and xenophobic MHP 
(Nationalist Movement Party, 70 seats)—as well as the Kurdish movement-based BDP 
(Peace and Democracy Party, represented in parliament as "independents").41 The 
AKP's rival within the Islamic camp, the Felicity Party, performed so poorly that it 
failed to reach the electoral threshold and is therefore not even represented in 
parliament in spite of the continuing presence of Erbakan, who not only founded 
Welfare but also led previous Islamic-oriented parties. In September 2010, the AKP 
handily won a referendum on constitutional amendments that, among other things, 
gives the government extra leverage against the military, and which tantalizingly 
opened up the possibility of a new constitution that could bear the AKP's "cultural 
stamp."42 In June 2011, the AKP easily won yet another election—garnering just under 
50 percent of the popular vote, compared to the CHP's 26 percent and the MHP's 13 
percent. However, due to extensive prior redistricting by the Supreme Electoral 
Board—seen to be hostile to the AKP—the party's victory translated to only 326 seats 
in the 550-member parliament, a number insufficient to allow it to preside over the 
process of writing a new constitution without consulting its rivals.43 Nevertheless, the 
result will no doubt encourage the AKP, already emboldened by its past victories, to
37 KPU Media Center, "KPU Ubah Perolehan Kursi Parpol di DPR," May 14, 2009, available at http: / / 
mediacenter.kpu.go.id/berita/472-kpu-rubah-perolehan-kursi-parpol-di-dpr.html (accessed June 14,
2010); and Pemilu Indonesia, "KPU Tetapkan Hasil Pemilu Legislatif 2009," May 10, 2009, available at 
www.pemiluindonesia.com/ pemilu-2009/ kpu-tetapkan-hasil-pemilu-legislatif-2009.html (accessed June 
14, 2010).
38 "Semangat Populis Partai Dakwah," Tempo Online, March 30, 2009, http: / / majalah.tempointeraktif. 
com/id/arsip/2009/03/30/LU/mbm.20090330.LU129923.id.html (accessed August 5, 2010).
39 Interview with PKS grassroots activist in Depok, University of Indonesia, July 7, 2010.
40 OSCE/ODIHR Assessment Report, "Republic of Turkey Parliamentary Elections 3 November 2002" 
(Warsaw, December 4, 2002), www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ turkey/16346 (accessed June 14, 2010).
41 OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report, "Republic of Turkey Early Parliamentary Elections 
22 July 2007" (Warsaw, November 27, 2007), www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/29181 (accessed June 
14,2010).
42 Ersin Kalaycioglu, "Turkish Referendum: Divided We Stand," Today's Zaman, September 19, 2010, 
www.todayszaman.com/ news-222065-turkish-referendum-divided-we-stand.html (accessed November 
20, 2010).
43 Mustafa Giirlek, "YSK Decision for Redistribution of Seats Found to be Controversial," Today's Zaman, 
June 15, 2011, www.todayszaman.com/mobile_detailn.action?newsld=247500 (accessed June 16, 2011).
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move more assertively against foes within the state, as seen in the public scrutiny being 
placed lately on the often shadowy political role of the military.
There should be little doubt that progress made in electoral politics by both the 
AKP, and, in a more limited sense, the PKS, is significant given that they both operate 
within an established secular environment underpinned by powerful and organized 
social interests (particularly within the secular nationalist political parties and 
militaries of the two countries). Moreover, Pancasila was invoked in Indonesia in the 
1980s to place institutional constraints on Islamic politics, although democratic change 
since 1998 has altered that situation. In Turkey, Islamic political parties remain even 
more restricted due to the radically secular nature of the Turkish Constitution. This 
suggests that the relative success of the AKP, as compared to that of the PKS, has had 
less to do with the legal-formal and institutional arrangement by which politics is 
governed than with the nature of the broader configuration of power and interest with 
which each has to contend, as discussed next.
The Genesis and Evolution of Islamic Politics
The Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic Association) is widely regarded as the first mass 
organization in the history of modern Indonesia. More so than socially oriented 
organizations like Muhammadiyah, SI was at the forefront of the nascent nationalist 
movement in the Dutch East Indies, and even gave rise to the Indonesian Communist 
Party. Driven by the apprehensions of the traditional petty bourgeoisie about 
competition from ethnic-Chinese traders, but supported as well by a range of Javanese 
minor aristocrats, the SI was pivotal in the development of the "idea" of Indonesia.44 
Nevertheless, the position of Islam in postcolonial Indonesia would be contested, as 
has been well documented.45 For example, the early postcolonial period saw efforts to 
enshrine Islam in the constitution, as well as to promote state involvement in the 
advancement of pribumi businesses, though with little success.
In truth, similar to much of the Middle East and North Africa, anticolonial 
struggles in Indonesia, after the short golden age of SI, were ultimately driven mainly 
by secular elite cohorts of nationalist intellectuals and politicians drawn mainly from 
colonial-era bureaucratic families, small groups of professionals, and the military. This 
would partly account for the lack of success in "Islamizing" the outcomes of the 
Indonesian nationalist struggle. Indonesian developments were mirrored in other 
Muslim-majority societies—such as Algeria, Syria, Iraq, and, with variations, in 
Egypt—where anticolonial movements led by secular elites spawned parties 
influenced by statist and socialist ideas to varying degrees, and which adopted 
nationalist agendas calling for the protection of domestic industry in the immediate 
postcolonial period. Given the absence of a strong bourgeoisie, this necessitated a 
dominant role for state-owned corporations and a new strata of state managers.
Turkey was never colonized and therefore its case presents some divergence from 
the pattern described above. However, because of the absence of any colonial 
experience, it actually had a head start in moving onto an economic-development
44 Robert E. Elson, The Idea o f Indonesia: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
45 Bernhard J. Boland, The Struggle o f Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).
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pathway that is not so significantly different from Indonesia's in important respects. 
The Republic of Turkey rose in the 1920s from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, where 
a regime based on loyalty and obedience to the sultan and the caliphate had little use 
for nationalism to ensure the legitimacy of the social order. The Turkish defeat in 
World War I provided the opportunity for General Mustafa Kemal (later Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk) to fashion an almost entirely new polity (although the seeds of his 
reforms had already been planted by the later sultans and by the Young Turk 
movement). As is well known, Mustafa Kemal instituted radical steps to 
"Europeanize" Turkey and to eliminate Islam from matters of the state and from the 
public sphere. Ataturk went as far as to ban certain attire and headgear regarded as 
being culturally Muslim, in favor of Western clothes and hats. The point certainly was 
to suppress the power of religion because religion "was the legitimizing principle of 
the old Empire, as well as the vocabulary most commonly available to the opponents 
of the new legitimating principle" of state-defined Turkish nationalism.46
At first there may have been little to indicate that top-down national state building 
would go hand in hand with statist developmentalism. Even as Christian Armenians, 
Greeks, and Jews—many of whom essentially constituted the commercial classes of the 
Ottoman era—were eliminated en masse soon after the First World War, a hotchpotch 
of Muslims from surrounding areas (the Balkans, Russia) came to be "Turkish."47 This 
was the case even as the status of the Kurdish minority in the Turkish nation-state 
remained highly contested. Many of these newly "Turkish" citizens replaced those 
who had been forced to leave their positions in rural commercial agriculture and urban 
petty trade. The newcomers were then brought into the nationalist project and became 
obedient subjects of the modern nation-state-in-formation. 48 Because of their 
background, furthermore, they were neither economically nor politically assertive, and 
this condition made possible the emergence of state-led capitalism, which began to 
gain prominence in the 1930s as the Republican government moved to purchase or 
nationalize many foreign-owned enterprises, especially railways and public services. 
Thus was started the statism and protectionist policies that anticipated developments 
that would much later become a staple of modernization in Indonesia and other 
postcolonial countries.49
In other words, while Islam contributed to imaginings about a postcolonial, 
modern Indonesia-to-come, it was, by contrast, anathema to the initial idea of a post- 
Ottoman Turkish state based on modern ideas of citizenship. The fact that the SI was, 
foremost, a reaction against colonial-era economic encroachment by ethnic Chinese 
and non-Muslim businesses represents an important historical legacy that finds no 
parallel in the Turkish case. In Indonesia, Islamic politics would henceforth be partly 
defined by a consciousness about the considerable merging of class and ethno-religious 
politics and the role of the state in presiding over that merger. It is well-known that 
there were widespread feelings among the traditional Muslim petty bourgeoisie that 
Chinese businesses were being favored by the Dutch for a host of cultural and political
46 C^aglar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development (London: Verso, 1987), p. 89.
47 On the Armenian genocide, see Taner Akcam, From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the 
Armenian Genocide (London: Zed Books, 2004).
48 Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, pp. 80-83.
49 Ibid, p. 105.
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reasons. Such sentiments have continually resurfaced in postcolonial times and were 
arguably heightened during the New Order when the corrupt and cronyistic 
relationship between state and business was exemplified by the cosy ties between the 
families of President Soeharto and top ethnic Chinese tycoon Liem Sioe Liong.
In Turkey, however, there would be a different dynamic: the interrelationship 
between state capitalism and private business gave rise to a select group of 
conglomerates that became pivots of the Kemalist social order. While giant 
conglomerates like Koc and Sabanci thrived under state protectionism, and dominated 
all industry, commerce, and finance, the military itself developed as a formidable 
corporate presence through Oyak, which ostensibly began as a military "solidarity 
fund." In other words, the staunchest guardian of the social order built on secularist 
nationalism, the military, had developed a strong, vested economic interest in its 
maintenance.50 But this was a social order that was insular, corrupt, and highly 
cronystic, and which alienated large sections of society. It is in this sense that the rise of 
the AKP was the culmination of long-developing social resentments among disparate 
groups toward the way that power was organized within the secular social order. 
Ironically, these groups were the product of Turkish economic modernization itself. As 
mentioned, they include the peripheralized Anatolian bourgeoisie (traditionally 
subordinate to Istanbul-based big business), the newly educated urban middle class, 
and the poor, who inhabited increasingly vast urban slums. The genius of the AKP has 
been in developing strategies and a vernacular that would bind these otherwise 
disparate groups together—a forward-looking brand of Islam not afraid of 
globalization that tempers its social depravations not just with moral injunctions, but 
with distinctively populist policies of providing social welfare, assistance, and services 
to the downtrodden.
From this point of view, the PKS remains well behind the AKP—PKS has yet to 
develop an unambiguous stand in support of markets and neoliberal globalization—in 
many ways it cannot do so given the ethnic composition of the Indonesian bourgeoisie 
and the unequal respective strengths of its pribumi and non-pribumi elements. 
Although the PKS has developed a notable presence in providing social services to the 
poor to go along with dakwah, again encouraged by the model offered by the AKP (and 
before it, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood), such activities remain more associated in 
the Muslim community in Indonesia with longer established organizations like the 
Muhammadiyah and NU. In other words the PKS is hindered from forming strong 
alliances with the bourgeoisie and with the poor in the Indonesian context.
It is nevertheless evident that processes of economic change under the New 
Order—initially taking place under an ISI framework supported by windfall oil 
revenue, before economic liberalization gathered steam in the 1980s—greatly affected 
Indonesia's class structure. It unleashed a host of social transformations that made 
possible the emergence of the PKS in the first place. Such transformations not only 
gave rise to a powerful capital-owning class, largely represented in ethnic-Chinese- 
owned conglomerates, but also a new urban middle class,51 and a sizeable modern
50 Ismet Akga, Military Economic Structure in Turkey: Present Situation, Problems, and Solutions (Istanbul:
Tesev Publications, 2010).
51 A recent official Indonesian survey of consumption data would suggest that the urban middle class 
constitutes 26.5 percent of the population (being slightly less than two thirds of a total middle class that is
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industrial proletariat, which co-exists with a burgeoning lumpenproletariat sprawled 
over Indonesia's growing urban formations. The visible emergence of huge and chaotic 
urban slums from the 1970s was indicative of how rural peasants continued to flock 
into the cities, seeking new ways to make a living or to pursue higher-level educational 
opportunities. Some of these, perhaps especially those whose rural social positions 
were relatively more privileged, gained entry to the urban middle class through the 
avenue of education—broadened during the New Order—even if only on its lower 
rungs. Much of the social base of the PKS can be found among such upwardly mobile 
sections of the urban population.
It is not surprising that the ostentatious development of alliances between 
Indonesian officialdom and the conglomerates came to be commonly associated in the 
public mind with the continuation of the colonial-era pattern of concentration of wealth 
in the hands of the ethnic-Chinese minority—and away from the majority Muslim 
population. As the New Order became more visibly corrupt and rapacious, hostility 
toward the state and Chinese businesses became almost inextricably related. It was in 
this context that incidents such as those in Lampung and Tanjung Priok, and the 
Komando Jihad affair, mentioned earlier, took place, all of which had to do with the 
alleged activities of groups aiming to establish a state based on Islamic law to replace the 
one based on the secular creed ofPancasila. That hostility toward the existing social order 
was expressed in some sections of society through the idioms of Islam was not entirely 
surprising. The suppression of communist and broadly Leftist ideologies after 1965 
meant that these were no longer to be available at the start of structural transformations 
that would forever alter Indonesia's social landscape. Not surprisingly, too, the 
suppression of the Left spilled over into the next decade, in accordance with the pattern 
in much of the Middle East, to state-imposed constraints on middle class-based political 
liberalism.52
But Islam could not have offered an appropriate ideological resource to express 
resentment unless political aspirations that drew on it were sustained in Indonesia—as 
they were in Turkey—through a host of social and political networks that often 
functioned in semi-clandestine fashion during periods of often intense repression. In 
Indonesia, the activists of the Masyumi Party that was banned by President Soekarno 
in 1960 had turned to such activities as proselytizing, as had those of the Darul Islam 
(which was militarily defeated in 1962), and made these the foundations for 
developing new social networks. The religious activities of students were alluded to 
earlier, and in campus-based groupings many young people, of whom a great number 
had been newly urbanized, experienced a formative period of political socialization. 
Masyumi figures were especially instrumental in the establishment of the Dewan 
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, a conservative body established by the revered 
Mohammad Natsir,53 with whose support the pesantren at Ngruki, Central Java, was
said to account for 43 percent of the population). A large portion of that segment, however, would be 
classified as "lower middle class," and its members are said to be vulnerable to slipping into poverty. See 
Asian Development Bank, "The Rise of Asia's Middle Class," in Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 
2010 (Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2010), p. 11, available at www.adb.org/ 
Documents/Books/Key lndicators/2010/ pdf/Key-Indicators-2010.pdf (accessed February 12, 2011).
52 Sandra Halperin, "The Post-Cold War Political Topography of the Middle East: Prospects for 
Democracy," Third World Quarterly 26,7 (2005): 1135-56.
53 It was because of Natsir's international standing that the DDE (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia,
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established in the early 1970s,54 well before its founders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu 
Bakar Ba'asyir, had forged real connections with the remnants of Darul Islam or had 
anything to do with the establishment of Jema'ah Islamiyah. By the 1980s and 1990s, 
similar initiatives had made significant inroads into places—now peri-urbanized— 
such as in Central Java, which were formerly communist and radical-nationalist 
strongholds.55 It is an historical irony that some of these old strongholds are currently 
the very places where special units of the Indonesian security forces come to hunt 
down terrorists with an Islamist agenda.
In the Turkish case, Islamic self-identities and aspirations were preserved for 
decades in spite of the onslaught of the radical secularist project within numerous 
tarekat that were heavily influenced by strands of Sufism. In contrast to common 
assumptions, it was as early as the 1950s that their members were granted access to the 
public sphere, mainly due to overtures from the Democratic Party that had defeated 
the CHP in 1950, and which had tried, but dramatically failed, to gain further leverage 
against the former ruling party and the military by accommodating religious groups. 
In subsequent decades, however, and even under conditions of general repression, 
such Turkish Islamic groups were sometimes invited into state-led campaigns against 
the Left; and this happened predominantly in the 1980s, as already mentioned. Among 
the most influential of these was the Naksibendi sect, which gave rise to the leader of 
the even more important Nur movement, Said Nursi. It was the latter's teachings that 
were appropriated by today's wealthy and highly organized Gillen movement. Led by 
Fethullah Giillen, currently living in exile in the United States, the movement presides 
over educational institutions found all over Turkey, as well as a formidable business 
empire.56 The movement or "community," whose members are found in important 
positions in Turkish public life, is widely believed to exercise considerable influence 
over the AKP, and over state institutions, such as the police force.
The point is that in both countries the traditional concerns of Islamic politics 
became grafted onto the aspirations, grievances, and anxieties of new social groups 
emerging from the modernization process. This was made possible because of the 
resilience of Islamic groups in the face of state repression, but also because these 
groups had served, in the Cold War context, useful roles in the fight against the Left in 
both Indonesia and Turkey. It should be pointed out, though, that what is ideologically 
on offer in the Indonesian case remains more varied than in Turkey's in an important 
respect. Members of the Indonesian urban underclass, for example, have been 
continually exposed to the secular nationalism of Soekarno as preserved in much 
milder forms by successor organizations to the old Soekarnoist PNI (Partai Nasional 
Indonesia, Indonesian National Party), including today's PDIP. In the most populous 
island of Java, in particular, Soekarnoist secular nationalism has continued to maintain
Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation) later became a conduit for the entry of Middle Eastern funds 
into Indonesia, making possible broad-ranging proselytizing activities.
54 Interview with Ustad Wahyudin, director of the A1 Mukmin pesantren, Ngruki, July 16, 2007; and with 
Ustad Taufik Usman, head of the foundation that oversees the same pesantren, Ngruki, July 18, 2007.
55 Interview with leaders of Forum Komunikasi Keluarga Darul, Tawangmangu, Karanganyar, Central 
Java, July 25, 2010.
56 Berna Turam, Between Islam and the State: The Politics o f Engagement (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2007); and M. Hakan Yakuz and John L. Esposito, eds., Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gillen 
Movement (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2003).
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romantic ideas of the noble struggles of patriotic wong cilik (little people) against the 
depredations of the privileged—a narrative which remains as powerful as that which 
focuses on the deprived ummah. But this narrative did not fill the void left by the 
absence of Left politics, one that became even bigger as Indonesian society was 
transformed under the Soeharto regime, and which some social agents of Islamic 
politics have continually attempted to fill. Nothing expresses this better than the 
paramilitary organizations operating under the banner of Islam, and linked to a 
number of Islamic parties in many Indonesia cities, which often draw members from 
the unemployed or only precariously employed. Significantly, there is nothing that is 
similar to the Soekarnoist secular tradition in the Turkish case—the doctrine of Ataturk 
was always more unreservedly statist. This has made it easier for the AKP to dominate 
the populist ground, even as it reaches out to a wider range of social interests through 
its adoption of the vision of neoliberal progress.
Conclusion
The manifestations of the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis created the conditions that 
led to the demise of the Soeharto regime in 1998, and opened the way for Indonesian 
democratization. Indonesian Islamic political parties, however, have done relatively 
poorly within the framework of electoral democracy, including the much celebrated 
PKS. The AKP in Turkey, on the other hand, which was first voted into power in 2002 
on the back of that country's own profound economic crisis, has had a much better 
record of taking advantage of the opportunities presented by electoral competitions. 
On the surface, the parties are similar in having situated issues of governance at the 
forefront of their struggles in place of avid pronouncements on matters overtly 
religious, but their social bases remain considerably different.
In explaining the dissimilar levels of success experienced by PKS and AKP, the 
article has put forward the idea that AKP has managed to present itself as the voice of 
not only a rising section of the Turkish bourgeoisie, but also of the most downtrodden 
in society. Furthermore, it is also favored by highly educated and newly ambitious 
members of the urban middle class—those individuals turned off by cronyistic 
relationships that, heretofore, have been the key to social and economic advancement. 
In other words, the article has argued that, in the Turkish case, a basically neoliberal 
governance agenda has been successfully wedded to populist concerns that have their 
origins in Islamic networks struggling to survive the onslaught of radical secularism, 
concerns that found new relevance in the transformations brought forth by 
modernization. By implication, this analysis has questioned why the PKS, which has 
followed the model presented by the AKP, has been unable to cement a similar sort of 
coalition of diverse social interests in Indonesia. It is suggested that this failure goes a 
long way in accounting for the limited progress achieved by PKS since 2004.
It has also been suggested that the answer to the question is not to be found 
primarily in the internal dynamics of the parties concerned. The answer is located, 
instead, in the way that the development of Islamic party politics more generally is 
intertwined with broad historical and social processes. It is clear that both the PKS and 
AKP have benefited from the legacies of Cold War-era conflicts that saw the demise of 
the Left. This is part of a much more general phenomenon in the Muslim world;
18 Vedi R. Hadiz
writing on the Maghreb, Alejandro Colas has observed how social-justice issues—once 
the purview of Leftists—have been taken over by Islamists.57
But the PKS and the AKP are not just interested in social-justice issues, for the key 
is to develop a form of politics attractive to a constituency comprising a cross-section of 
classes. In the Indonesian case, however, the PKS is hamstrung by the nature of the 
Indonesian bourgeoisie, the overwhelmingly dominant Chinese element of which has 
no reason to challenge a social order in which they have benefited from cosy 
relationships with officialdom. Of course, the ethnic Chinese more generally are aware 
of their politically vulnerable situation and how these relationships, since colonial 
times, may be altered in a heartbeat. While the PKS has been successful in developing 
support from educated members of the new urban middle class, it has been much less 
credible than the AKP as an advocate for the poor ensconced in Indonesia's growing 
urban and peri-urban social formations. Overtures by the PKS to the urban poor have 
also been constrained by the deep influence of mass organizations like the 
Muhammidiyah and the NU, which operate a host of welfare and educational activities 
traditionally serving the underprivileged. Such organizations, especially the 
Muhammadiyah (because of a generally more urbanized following), have some reason 
to be apprehensive of any inroads the PKS makes in winning the allegiance of the 
ummah.
Finally, unlike the PKS, the AKP does not confront competition in the sphere of 
populist politics from well-established secular groupings. The PKS is also hampered by 
the presence of secular populist parties that stretch back to the days of Soekarno and 
which were preserved in the New Order, even if necessarily revised and sustained in 
muted forms. It is significant that the main vehicle of secular Kemalist politics, the 
CHP, had already lost its hegemony over state power and societal organization well 
before the New Order had even been invented in Indonesia.
In a nutshell, this article has offered a political economy-based understanding of 
the limitations of Islamic party politics in Indonesia, connecting these to Indonesian 
class development and social interests. It has done so by gathering insights from 
comparisons with the Turkish case, long considered the most prominent example of a 
successful democracy in the Muslim world. The contrasting experiences of the PKS and 
the AKP reveal some of the conditions influencing the success of electoral strategies 
based on displacing overt support for Islamic-oriented agendas in favor of those that 
advance notionally more inclusive ones. More generally, the Indonesian and Turkish 
cases suggest a more complex relationship between electoral politics and Islamic 
political parties than is recognized in approaches mainly concerned with democracy's 
purported ideologically "moderating" outcomes.
57 Alejandro Colas, "The Re-Invention of Populism: Islamist Responses to Capitalist Development in the 
Contemporary Maghreb," Historical Materialism 12,4 (2004): 231-60.
